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Abstract 
This study examines the efficiency of tools for fighting software piracy in the conditional 
distributions of software piracy. Our paper examines software piracy in 99 countries for the 
period 1994-2010, using contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. The intuition 
for modelling distributions contingent on existing levels of software piracy is that the 
effectiveness of tools against piracy may consistently decrease or increase simultaneously with 
increasing levels of software piracy. Hence, blanket policies against software piracy are unlikely 
to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of software piracy and tailored differently 
across countries with low, medium and high levels of software piracy. Our findings indicate that 
GDP per capita, research and development expenditure, main intellectual property laws, 
multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, World Intellectual Property Organisation treaties, money 
supply and respect of the rule of law have negative effects on software piracy. Equitably 
distributed wealth reduces software piracy, and the tendency not to indulge in software piracy 
because of equitably distributed wealth increases with increasing software piracy levels. Hence, 
the negative degree of responsiveness of software piracy to changes in income levels is an 
increasing function of software piracy. Moreover the relationships between policy instruments 
and software piracy display various patterns, namely: U-shape, Kuznets-shape, S-shape and 
negative thresholds. A negative threshold represents negative estimates with increasing negative 
magnitude throughout the conditional distributions of software piracy. We also discuss the policy 
implications of our study.  
JEL Classification: F42, K42, O34, O38, O57 
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Introduction  
 
 It is now widely acknowledged that a competitive environment for twenty-first century 
development is centered on the knowledge economy (KE), which fundamentally depends on 
intellectual capital and protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). In essence, IPRs 
protection mechanisms play a fundamental role in the development of KE dimensions, namely: 
innovation, information and communication technologies (ICTs), education, economic incentives 
and institutional regimes (Asongu 2014a). In the process of development, while advances in KE 
and corresponding technologies have resulted in a wider availability of ICT-related commodities, 
there is some consensus in scholarly and policy circles that reversed-engineering is appropriate 
to enhance development catch-up because the existing technologies in some less developed 
countries are more imitative and adaptive in nature than in developed countries (Mansfield 1994; 
Maskus and Penubarti 1995; Seyoum 1996; Lee and Mansfield 1996)1. The technologies 
employed to imitate, copy or pirate KE commodities have been proliferating. In our survey of the 
current literature, even though there are deep concerns regarding the piracy of software2, the 
debate on the relevance of IPRs protection in the software piracy industry is still wide open.  
 Two main schools of thought have animated the mainstream debate on IPRs protection. 
The first consists of scholars who advocate that economic development is facilitated by enhanced 
protection of IPRs (Gould and Gruben 1996; Falvey et al. 2006). According to this school, the 
positive nexus is facilitated via an appealing effect of stronger IPRs on factor productivity. 
Conversely, there is another school of thought which views adherence to strict IPRs protection 
and ratification of international IPRs treaties, as unfavorable to the economic prosperity of 
developing countries (Yang and Maskus, 2001; Andrés and Goel 2011, 2012). According to this 
school, looser IPRs regimes are essential in the short-run (at least) for less advanced countries to 
enjoy technology spillovers needed for economic development. This position is consistent with 
studies which demonstrate that software piracy promotes gains by copyright holders (Tunca and 
Wu 2012), scientific publications (Asongu 2014a) and pro-poor development (Asongu 2014b)3. 
                         
1
 According to this strand of literature, as nations develop, adoption of more stringent IPRs regimes would, inter 
alia: (i) stimulate exports (Maskus and Penubarti 1995); (ii) favor technology transfers and innovation (Lee and 
Mansfield 1996) and (iii) increase the possibility of investment from multinational enterprises (Mansfield 1994; 
Seyoum 1996). 
2
 We use the terms ‘software piracy’ and ‘piracy’ interchangeably throughout the paper.  
3
 Intuitively, software piracy promotes pro-poor development by making pirated technologies available to less 
developed countries but this piracy is harmful for copyright holders because they lose the benefit of having the 
 3
These contending positions on IPRs protection have led to a substantial bulk of qualitative 
studies (Peitz and Waelbroeck 2006; Lau 2006) but a new stream of quantitative literature has 
been emerging that  focuses on socioeconomic determinants of piracy in the copyright industry 
(Bezmen and Depken 2004; Banerjee et al. 2005; Bezmen and Depken 2006; Andrés 2006a; 
Goel and Nelson 2009). The present inquiry partly builds on this stream of the literature to 
determine socioeconomic factors that deter software piracy.  
 The literature on fighting software piracy can be discussed in three main themes. The first 
theme is the fight against software piracy through non-legal mechanisms such as:  community 
engagement, ‘making legal easier’, online-only offerings and digital rights management (Holm 
2014). The second theme is the use of catch-up techniques for IPRs policy harmonisation 
(Asongu 2013).  The third theme concerns fighting software piracy through mechanisms of:   (i) 
certainty in punishment (Yoo et al. 2011); (ii) IPRs protection  contingent on  legal origins 
(Asongu 2015) and knowledge of ethics codes in academic institutions (Santillanes and Felder 
2015); (iii) democratic standards (Piquero & Piquero, 2006); (iv) informal institutions like 
religion (El-Baily and Gouda 2011); (v) lawsuits against peer-to-peer networks and 
corresponding consumers (Tunca 2012); (vi) the equity theory or fairness (Glass and Wood 
1996; Douglas et al. 2007)4; (vii)  good governance (Andrés and Asongu 2013); (viii) human 
development and good institutions (Driouchi et al. 2015) and (xi) Software User Identity Module 
(SUIM) (Adu et al. 2014).  
 The third theme is closest to the present inquiry. In the broader framework of the third 
theme, this study aims to make a twofold contribution. First, it builds on the documented 
mechanisms of fighting software piracy to present a more holistic global perspective on fighting 
piracy.  Both macroeconomic and IPRs protection variables are used for this purpose. Second, 
we steer clear of the engaged literature which has assessed tools in the fight against software 
piracy by modeling piracy at the mean of the software piracy distribution (see Andrés 2006b; 
Asongu 2015; Andrés and Asongu, 2013). Therefore, we assess the effect of mechanisms 
                                                                               
copyright and they are mainly in the developed countries. The positive impact of piracy on scientific publications is 
because the scholars in third world countries are able to use the software that is pirated and which they would not be 
able to use if it was not pirated.  Fighting individual piracy can also backfire on copyright holders because: (i) 
commercial piracy can increase the copyright holders’ profits due to a higher population of consumers and (ii) 
considerable detection and prosecution of individual piracy can also reduce the profits of copyright holders (Tunca 
and Wu 2012). The last point while counter-intuitive can be partly explained by the fact that the substantial use of a 
product, even if pirated, could increase publicity and purchase of legal versions of the same product.  
4
 If people think piracy is unfair, they are less likely to engage in the use of pirated software. 
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deterring software piracy throughout the conditional distribution of software piracy. In this 
manner, we distinguish countries with low-, medium- and high-initial levels of software piracy. 
The policy relevance of accounting for existing levels in software piracy in the modeling 
exercise builds on the intuition that instruments in the fight against software piracy are unlikely 
to be effective unless they are contingent in initial software piracy levels and hence, tailored 
differently across countries with low-, medium- and high-levels of software piracy. For a 
quantitative examination of this question, we employ contemporary and non-contemporary 
quantile regressions on panel data pertaining to 99 countries. 
 The paper has been organised into five main sections. The “Software piracy, IPRs 
protection and development” section discusses linkages between software piracy, IPRs 
protection and development. The “Data and methodology” section discusses the nature of data 
used and the issues relating to the methodology employed. The “Empirical results” section 
provides the results of the quantitative examination of the data and an analysis of the results from 
this examination. “Further discussion, policy implications and caveats” section explores some 
important policy implications emerging from the paper and some necessary caveats. The 
“Conclusion” section provides a brief summary of the main findings and the analysis, and finally 
concludes with offering some possible directions for future research in the area of software 
piracy.  
 
Software piracy, IPRs protection and development   
IPRs and development  
 There are two main mechanisms through which the strength of IPRs laws and intellectual 
property (IP) can influence development and economic growth, notably:  (i) a direct analysis of 
the degree by which IPRs affect the creation and diffusion of knowledge within and across 
countries and (ii) an analysis of the impact of a country’s IPRs laws on trade and international 
transaction, hence an indirect effect on growth (see Bezmen and Depken 2014; Asongu 2015).  
 In the first strand on creation and dissemination of information, the need for IPRs 
regimes is justified by endogenous theoretical underpinnings of economic growth which suggest 
that by investing in research and development (R&D), investors and society are respectively 
rewarded with higher returns and knowledge.  According to Romer (1990) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), the accumulation of knowledge that is essential for economic prosperity is 
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facilitated by the decreasing cost of future innovations. The intuition behind this narrative is that 
restrictive and/or stringent IPRs laws are fundamentally based on the idea that IPRs protection 
encourages innovations and inventions which engender positive externalities on growth.  There 
is a growing demand for tighter IPRs regimes by newly industrialised nations, which are 
requesting for more stringent regulations in regional, multilateral and bilateral arrangements 
(Asongu 2015).  
 Bezmen and Depken (2004), in the second strand, maintain that the development of a 
country is influenced by IPRs regimes through the country’s international engagements, such as 
technology transfers, foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade. According to Todaro and Smith 
(2015), the theoretical underpinnings on endogenous growth are consistent with the perception 
that international trade is an important stimulus to growth, since it is likely that human resources 
within an economy would be more fully utilized as a country becomes more exposed to world 
markets. Furthermore, with the relevant absorptive capacities, openness facilitates technology 
transfer by enabling foreign investors to engage with research-intensive and resource sectors.  
 
Unfortunately, owing to initial conditions or country-specific factors, there is no consensus in the 
literature that international openness promotes economic growth under all circumstances for all 
countries under consideration (Henry 2007; Kose et al. 2011)5. There is a wealth of literature 
maintaining that tight IPRs laws are relevant in stimulating exports (Maskus and Penubarti 
1995), technological transfers (Lee and Mansfield 1996) and investment from multinational 
companies (Mansfield 1994; Seyoum 1996). Conversely, as highlighted in the introduction, there 
is also a  position in the literature arguing that strict IPRs may have negative effects on scientific 
publications, copyright holder profits and pro-poor development (Yang and Maskus 2001; Tunca 
and Wu, 2012; Asongu 2014ab). 
 
 
Piracy and IPRs protection  
 
  Patents and copyrights are the two key areas of IPRs (Shadlen et al. 2003; Asongu 
2015).  A form of expression such as artistic work and written material is protected by a 
                         
5
 Also see recent literature focusing on the effects of globalisation, in inter alia: (i) trade (Shuaibu 2015); (ii) 
employment (Anyanwu 2014; Foster-McGregor et al. 2015); (iii) growth (Kummer-Noormamode 2014; Tumwebaze 
and Ijjo 2015) and (iv) welfare (Makochekanwa 2014).  
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copyright while new ideas that result in industrial processes or products are protected by patents.  
Computer software has traditionally been protected by ordinary copyright law. However, more 
recently, patent protection has been granted to software developers.  When patents and 
copyrights are not enforced by governments, an artistic creation or invention process is subject to 
traditional collective action. In essence, the design of IPRs is intended to address concerns about 
collective action by endowing authors and investors with some vocational selective incentives or 
temporal monopolies. Ultimately, while copyrights and patents are in the interest of IP 
producers, adopting very stringent IPRs regimes may not be attractive to consumers who cannot 
afford the high price of the protected commodities. 
 An optimal level of IPRs protection is tailored towards managing the delicate trade-off 
between producers and consumers of knowledge. The process is complex because IPRs are 
intangible commodities and, hence, are not the same as normal property rights. In addition, the 
same idea protected by IPRs can be exploited simultaneously and repeatedly by an unlimited 
number of users without depleting the stock of idea. Hence, for certain patents like those 
associated with the treatment of HIV/AIDS in poor countries, the standard rationale for granting 
patent owners extensive rights may be inhumane, unfeasible and against the principles of 
inclusive growth. In essence, endowing IP owners with rights to perpetually restrict usage and 
control the distribution of commodities is irrelevant because some IP-related commodities are 
non-excludable by definition. Conversely, in the absence of genuine motivations to producers, 
innovations may be under-supplied.  
  Yang and Maskus (2001) argue and demonstrate that limitations on the use of an idea 
can freeze the idea and hence stifle innovation. Accordingly, tight IPRs would decrease 
incentives for new technologies and innovations (see Helpman 1993; Maskus 2000; Bessen and 
Maskin 2000). As emphasised by Shadlen et al. (2005), surplus production can lead to a 
substitution of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ with the ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’, essentially 
because downstream innovation may be negatively affected by limited access to upstream 
innovation. It follows that the unavoidable challenge in the management of IPRs is to provide 
incentives for ‘knowledge creation’ without necessarily restricting distribution of corresponding 
knowledge.  
 Lessig (2001 p. 252) has emphasised that granting extensive copyrights and patent 
protection renders IPRs effectively permanent because by the time some applications and 
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systems of operations are brought to the public domain, they are almost obsolete.  The caveat 
entails the introduction of: (i) lengthier periods of protection, (ii) more protection scope for 
owners of copyright and (iii) software under copyright law. More recently, in addition to the 
challenging trade-off between limited diffusion of new knowledge and innovation, there has 
been an evolving policy concern regarding the understanding of the mechanisms by which 
software piracy can be minimised.  
Noticeably, the engaged literature leaves room for improvement in understanding how 
existing levels of software piracy affect the determinants of software piracy. We attempt to fill 
up this research gap by answering the following question: do initial levels of software piracy 
matter in understanding how macroeconomic variables such as GDP per capita and IPRs 
mechanisms affect software piracy?  
 
Data and methodology 
Data  
 We examine panel data for 99 countries for the period 1994-2010 from the:  Business 
Software Alliance (BSA); World Bank Development Indicators (WDI); Financial Development 
and Structure Database (FDSD) and World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). 
Limitations to the number of countries and periodicity are due to constraints in data availability.  
 The proxy for software piracy is defined as “the unauthorized copying of computer 
software which constitutes copyright infringement for either commercial or personal use” (SIIA 
2000)6. According to this narrative, software piracy is multidimensional and could take one of 
the following forms, inter alia: business or commercial piracy, individuals’ piracy and organised 
copying. Three main types of software piracy are distinguished by the BSA, namely: 
counterfeiting, downloading and end-user copying. Owing to these variations, a concern in the 
literature has been to obtain an accurate indicator of software piracy. The level of software 
piracy is estimated as the difference in demand for new software applications (computed from 
PC shipments) and the legal supply of software. This line of inquiry measures software piracy as 
the percentage of software (business software for the most part) that is installed illegally (without 
a license) in a given country on a yearly basis. The corresponding variable is presented in 
percentage scale from no piracy (0%) to a scenario where all software installed during a given 
                         
6
 SIIA stands for Software and Information Industry Association.  
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year is of pirated origin (100%). More insights into the measurement are available in BSA (2007 
2009)7.  It is important to note that the BSA is an industry and its data on software piracy, though 
inherent of some upward bias8, is the most widely used in the literature.  
 The control variables or mechanisms for fighting software piracy are discussed in two 
main categories, notably: (i) seven institutional, ICT-related and macroeconomic factors and (ii) 
six ‘IPRs laws’-oriented factors. The first category consists of: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita, R&D expenditure, internet penetration, finance, life expectancy and rule of law. 
Internet penetration has been established to determine piracy (Asongu 2013). From intuition, the 
supply of money which is our indicator of financial development is very likely to mitigate piracy 
because people using pirated software have been documented to lack the financial means to 
purchase the right commodity (Moores and Esichaikul 2011). Moreover, the overall impact of 
money supply on piracy is contingent on the income-levels of those strongly associated with 
money velocity (Asongu 2015)9.  
Life expectancy, demographic change, economic development (GDP per capita), institutional 
development (e.g rule of law) and knowledge economy (e.g research and development) have also 
been documented to determine the level of piracy (Andrés and Goel 2011, pp. 7-8). In line with 
Goel and Nelson (2009), GDP per capita is expected to mitigate piracy because, with increasing 
wealth, if the fruits of economic prosperity are evenly distributed, ‘citizens would have the 
money to buy the right thing’. The rule of law is expected to keep piracy in check (Driouchi et al. 
2015).  
 The second category entails IPRs laws, namely:  constitution, main IP laws, IPRs laws, 
WIPO Treaties, multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties. Many empirical studies have 
documented significant nexuses between IPRs laws, international treaties, legal frameworks and 
software piracy  (Holm 2003; Van Kranenburg and Hogenbirk 2005; Ki et al. 2006; Baghci et al. 
2006; Andrés 2006a; Driouchi et al. 2015). The IPRs indicators are obtained from the WIPO. 
The IPRs laws and the main IP laws are those that are enacted by the legislature and enforced by 
                         
7
 Data from the BSA primarily measures commercial software piracy.  The interested reader can refer to Traphagan 
and Griffith (1998) and Png (2008) for more insights into the reliability of piracy data.   
8This data has been used extensively in the piracy literature (Marron and Steel 2000; Banerjee et al. 2005; Andrés 
2006a; Goel and Nelson 2009).  
9
 According to the narrative, piracy is strongly associated with poverty or the proportion of the population in the low 
income strata. This position is in accordance with the argument made by Moores and Esichaikul (2011, p.1) that the 
motivations for software piracy is related with the cultural and economic circumstances of those indulging in 
software piracy.   
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institutions while WIPO administered treaties are defined from the day they enter into force for 
the contracting party. IP relevant bilateral and multilateral treaties are also computed according 
to the date they are enforced by contracting parties. The above-mentioned IPRs variables have 
been used in recent software piracy literature (Asongu 2015).   
 It is important to note that the laws and regulations of each country are designed to 
ensure better enforcement of IPRs. Hence, it can be expected that countries that have conducted 
less modifications to their copyright laws are also more satisfied with their IPR protection levels 
and therefore enjoy less piracy rates compared to their counterparts that are still, inter alia:  
working on their copyright laws; modifying their copyright laws and signing new agreements to 
achieve better results. Legal information for the construction of the legal variables is from the 
WIPO.  Here, three types of agreements are considered: bilateral agreements, multilateral 
agreements and WIPO treaties. The interested reader can have more insights from the WIPO 
website10. However, the major difference between Main IP Laws refers to laws   enacted by the 
Legislature while Intellectual Property Rights Laws are: IP-related laws enacted by the 
Legislature and IP laws issued by the Executive11. 
 Definitions of variables and corresponding sources are presented in Appendix 1, the 
summary statistics in Appendix 2 and the correlation matrix in Appendix 3. The purpose of the 
correlation matrix is to mitigate potential issues of multicollinearity. In light of the substantial 
degree of substitution between some variables, two specifications are adopted in the modelling 
exercise.  
 
Methodology 
 
 We have already justified the need to examine mechanisms in the fight against software 
piracy throughout the conditional distributions of software piracy. For this purpose, we are 
consistent with the literature on conditional determinants by using quantile regressions (QR) as 
our estimation technique (Billger and Goel 2009; Okada and Samreth 2012). The procedure 
consists of accounting for initial levels of the dependent variable (Keonker and Hallock 2001), 
notably countries with low-, medium- and high-levels of software piracy.  
                         
10
 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ 
11
 For evidence on how the data is collected, the interested reader can refer to the case of Indonesia:  
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=ID.  
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Previous studies on the fight against software piracy have reported parameter estimates at 
the conditional mean of piracy (Andrés 2006ab; Andrés and Asongu 2013). While mean effects 
are important, we extend the scope of literature by employing QR in order to account for existing 
levels of software piracy. For instance, whereas the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach 
used by Andrés (2006b) is based on the assumption that software piracy and errors terms are 
normally distributed, the QR approach is not based on the hypothesis that error terms are 
distributed normally. Hence, this technique enables the line of inquiry to assess the effect of tools 
against software piracy with particular emphasis on bad, worse and the worst countries in terms 
of software piracy. Accordingly, with QR, the estimates of parameters are derived at multiple 
points of conditional distributions of software piracy  
The θ th quantile estimator of software piracy is obtained by solving the following 
optimization problem, where ( )1,0∈θ .12   
{ } { }
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As opposed to the OLS which is fundamentally based on minimising the sum of squared 
residuals, under the QR technique, the weighted sum of absolute deviations is minimised. For 
instance the 25th or 75th quintiles (with θ =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) are assessed. The 
conditional quintile of software piracy or iy given ix is: 
θβθ iiy xxQ ′=)/(                                                                                                           (2) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each θ th specific quantile. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE ′= β)/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of piracy.  
For the model in Eq. (2), the dependent variable iy  is the software piracy indicator while ix  
contains a constant term, GDP per capita, research and development expenditure (R&D), 
internet penetration, rule of law, life expectancy, financial development, constitution, main IP 
law,  IP law, WIPO treaties, multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties. The specifications in Eq. 
(1) are tailored to mitigate multicollinearity issues identified in Appendix 3.  
                         
12
 The quantile estimator is disclosed without subscripts in Eq. (1) for the purpose of simplicity and ease of 
presentation. 
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Empirical results 
Presentation of results  
Empirical findings are presented in Tables 1-2 below. While the left-hand-side (LHS) of 
the tables corresponds to contemporary estimations, the right-hand-side (RHS) entails non-
contemporary regressions. The purpose of lagging the independent variables on the RHS by a 
year is to have some bite on endogeneity (see Mlachila et al. 2014, p. 21). It is important to note 
that in the modelling exercise, the number of observations in contemporary specifications may 
be lower than those in non-contemporary specifications because of issues with degrees of 
freedom. This is essentially the case when combinations between the dependent variable and 
regressors are more apparent in non-contemporary regressions. Consistent differences in 
estimated parameters between OLS and quintiles (in terms of sign, significance and magnitude 
of significance) justify adoption of the empirical strategy. Hence, distinguishing mean effects 
and conditional mean effects avails more room for policy implications.  
Since the effects of piracy protection tools are examined throughout the conditional 
distributions of software piracy, corresponding tendencies are likely to take several patterns, 
namely: U-shape, Kuznets or inverted U-shape, S-shape and positive or negative threshold 
shapes. Positive thresholds within the context of this study are established when corresponding 
estimates of software protection tools consistently display decreasing negative magnitudes 
and/or increasing positive magnitudes throughout the conditional distributions of software 
piracy. On the other hand, negative thresholds are established by consistent increasing negative 
or decreasing positive magnitudes from estimated coefficients. The latter threshold perspective 
aligns with our line of inquiry because the purpose of the study is to identify instruments by 
which software piracy can be mitigated. Overall, the evidence of threshold supports the intuition 
for modelling the effects of software piracy throughout its conditional distributions, with the 
view that the tools against piracy may consistently decreases or increase concurrently with 
increasing levels of software piracy.  
The following findings can be established from Table 1. First, there is evidence of a 
negative threshold from: (i) GDP per capita and internet penetration throughout the distributions 
of software piracy and (ii) R&D and main IP law from the 0.25th to the 0.90th quintile. Second, 
there is a U-shape nexus from multilateral treaties, with a trough at the 0.50th quintile. In other 
 12
words, the degree of negativity increases up to the 0.50th quantile, then decreases through the 
0.90th quintile. Third, the constitution and WIPO treaties have negative effects on software 
piracy exclusively at the highest quintile while the negative effect of bilateral treaties are more 
apparent in the bottom half of the distribution through the 0.75th quintile. Fourth, the effects of 
population growth and IP laws are positive. Fifth, findings on the LHS are broadly consistent 
with those of the RHS.  
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                Table 1: Conditional Determinants (First Specification)  
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  2.562 1.482*** 2.351*** 2.416*** 3.125*** 3.795*** 2.874*** 2.448*** 2.640*** 2.910*** 3.443*** 3.822*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gross Domestic Product  -0.51*** -0.353*** -0.483*** -0.501*** -0.619*** -0.747*** -0.566*** -0.505*** -0.533*** -0.585*** -0.689*** -0.745*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Research and Development  -0.078*** -0.089*** -0.059*** -0.078*** -0.093*** -0.112*** -0.082*** -0.071*** -0.067*** -0.076*** -0.093*** -0.122*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet  Penetration  -0.090*** -0.049*** -0.069*** -0.099*** -0.126*** -0.136*** -0.045** 0.014 -0.020 -0.040** -0.100*** -0.115*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.130) (0.176) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  0.043* 0.039** 0.014 0.050*** 0.063*** 0.073*** 0.005 -0.042** -0.021 -0.0005 0.039 0.054** 
 (0.065) (0.012) (0.481) (0.006) (0.005) (0.000) (0.798) (0.030) (0.252) (0.975) (0.104) (0.016) 
Constitution  -0.004 0.013 0.016 0.076*** -0.020 -0.145*** 0.002 0.026* 0.027 0.073*** -0.020 -0.133*** 
 (0.857) (0.549) (0.486) (0.000) (0.427) (0.000) (0.916) (0.089) (0.192) (0.001) (0.442) (0.000) 
Main Intellectual Property Law -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.012** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intellectual Property Law 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004* 0.0002 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.001 0.001 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.073) (0.907) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.382) (0.367) (0.001) (0.000) 
WIPO Treaties 0.002 0.005 -0.0005 0.010* -0.004 -0.020*** 0.004 0.012*** 0.008 0.011** -0.004 -0.025*** 
 (0.736) (0.298) (0.941) (0.089) (0.514) (0.009) (0.459) (0.009) (0.157) (0.049) (0.591) (0.000) 
Multilateral Treaties  -0.015*** -0.010 -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bilateral  Treaties  0.001 -0.006* -0.005 -0.008*** -0.007** 0.015*** 0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008***   -0.005 0.019*** 
 (0.807) (0.085) (0.207) (0.009) (0.030) (0.002) (0.672) (0.116) (0.117) (0.008) (0.162) (0.000) 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.721 0.493 0.512 0.505 0.511 0.523 0.745 0.509 0.531 0.526 0.526 0.548 
Fisher  207.27***      240.32***      
             
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 743 743 743 743 743 743 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions).  Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where software piracy is least. The number of observations in contemporary specifications is lower than in non-contemporary specifications because of issues in 
degrees of freedom. This is essentially so because the combinations between software piracy and regressors are more apparent in non-contemporary regressions.  
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Table 2: Conditional Determinants (Second Specification)  
             
 Contemporary Non-Contemporary 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  1.371*** 1.247** 2.252*** 1.182*** 1.290*** 0.499 1.553*** 1.553*** 2.699*** 1.609*** 1.550*** 1.287*** 
 (0.001) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.390) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law  -0.265*** -0.219*** -0.270*** -0.313*** -0.278*** -0.252*** -0.273*** -0.273*** -0.269*** -0.312*** -0.271*** -0.250*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Life Expectancy -0.118 -0.273 -0.750*** -0.075 0.004 0.699 -0.245 -0.245 -0.998*** -0.314** -0.160*** 0.180 
 (0.591) (0.320) (0.001) (0.621) (0.984) (0.023) (0.225) (0.225) (0.000) (0.033) (0.405) (0.403) 
Money Supply   -0.078*** -0.045 -0.011 -0.050*** -0.120*** -0.151*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.026 -0.046*** -0.119*** -0.145*** 
 (0.000) (0.129) (0.616) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.171) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population  -0.066*** -0.071*** -0.065*** -0.061*** -0.055*** -0.084*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.063*** -0.057*** -0.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constitution  0.028 0.007 0.020 0.023 -0.003 0.023 0.028 0.028 0.003 0.020 0.029*** 0.038** 
 (0.206) (0.746) (0.286) (0.112) (0.879) (0.400) (0.162) (0.162) (0.841) (0.172) (0.000) (0.036) 
Main Intellectual Property Law -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.032*** -0.046*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.030*** -0.042*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intellectual Property Law 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
WIPO Treaties -0.025*** 0.0004 -0.013** -0.028*** -0.034*** -0.047*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.007 -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.041*** 
 (0.000) (0.944) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Multilateral Treaties  -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.016*** -0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bilateral  Treaties  -0.005* -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.002 0.015*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.004* 0.022*** 
 (0.096) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.331) (0.000) (0.129) (0.129) (0.000) (0.001) (0.069) (0.000) 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.716 0.523 0.544 0.528 0.490 0.445 0.760 0.544 0.573 0.559 0.528 0.495 
Fisher  271.30***      353.57***      
Observations 839 839 839 839 839 839 855 855 855 855 855 855 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions).  Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where software piracy is least. The number of observations in contemporary specifications is lower than in non-contemporary specifications because of issues in 
degrees of freedom. This is essentially so because the combinations between software piracy and regressors are more apparent in non-contemporary regressions.  
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 In discussing the findings in Table 2, we first confirm those established in Table 1. First, 
the effect of main IP laws is consistently negative with a negative threshold from the 0.25th to the 
0.90th quintile on the LHS and 0.50th to 0.90th quintiles on the RHS. Second, consistent with 
Table 1, the effect of constitution is not very apparent. Third, the previously established U-shape 
from multilateral treaties is now S-shape on the LHS and Kuznets shape on the RHS. Fourth, the 
effect of WIPO treaties is no longer limited to the highest quintiles, but now more apparent in the 
top quintiles with a negative threshold (or increasing negative magnitude). Fifth, IP laws are still 
positive but now consistently significant throughout the software piracy distributions. Sixth, 
consistent with the evidence from Table 1, the effect of bilateral treaties are more apparent in the 
bottom half of the distribution up to the 0.75th quintile. Seventh, the previously scanty evidence 
of a negative effect from population growth is now consistently negative throughout software 
piracy distributions. 
 On the new findings, the following can be established. First, money supply decreases 
software piracy with a negative threshold or increasing negative magnitude in the top quintiles. 
Second, the negative effect of rule of law is U-shape throughout the distribution on the LHS and 
from the 0.25th quintile on the RHS. Third, the effect of life expectancy is negative and more 
apparent in the middle distributions on the RHS.  
 
 
Further discussion, policy implications and caveats  
 
  In this section, we engage with four main categories, notably: (i) assessing the notions of 
income, equity and equality in light of the established linkage between GDP per capita and 
software piracy; (ii) discussing another development-oriented category with emphasis on R&D, 
financial development and governance; (iii) understanding nexuses between IPRs regimes and 
software piracy and (iv) elaborating some unexpected relationships.  
 In the first category on ‘income, equity, equality and software piracy’, the negative effect 
of GDP per capita on software piracy is consistent with the empirical literature and the 
predictions of economic theory. Accordingly, the role of income-levels in fighting piracy is 
consistent with a current in the literature that argues that software piracy is more apparent in less 
developed countries (Moores and Esichaikul 2011; Asongu 2014a). This is essentially because 
low income countries lack the financial resources to boost R&D and innovation. Hence, they are 
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more likely to engage in reversed engineering because their technologies are more imitative and 
adaptive in nature than those in developed countries. This narrative is broadly consistent with 
Bezmen and Depken (2004), Tunca and Wu (2012) and Asongu (2014ab) notably, on the 
position that less stringent IPRs on software piracy could inter alia: (i) increase FDI; (ii) boost 
scientific publications (Asongu, 2014a); (iii) increase the profits of copyright holders (Tunca and 
Wu 2012) and (iv) facilitate pro-poor development (Asongu 2014b). The narrative also aligns 
with a recent finding from Driouchi et al. (2015) on a Kuznets (or inverted U-shaped) nexus 
between GDP per capita and piracy rates from a sample of world economies. Conversely, our 
finding that fighting software piracy effectively increases with incomes may not augur well with 
one position argued in the literature. According to that position, emphasising that stringent 
protection against software piracy in low income countries would increase development by:  (i) 
improving exports (Maskus and Penubarti 1995); (ii) facilitating innovation and the transfer of 
technology (Lee and Mansfield 1996) and (iii) boosting investment from multinational 
companies (Mansfield 1994; Seyoum 1996). In the light of our findings, it is reasonable to infer 
that IPRs regimes on software piracy should be consolidated concurrently with increasing levels 
of income. This inference doubles as a policy recommendation.  
 There is also an ethical dimension to the findings that merits emphasis. In essence, 
citizens of poor countries are likely to engage in the use of pirated software because they lack the 
financial resources to buy the ‘correct thing’. This aligns with the equity theory (Glass and Wood 
1996) and empirical insights into the validity of the equity theory (Douglas et al. 2007). The 
underlying intuition in the equity theory is that individuals are less likely to use pirated software 
if they view such usage as unfair. Hence it is reasonable to deduct that a situational state of 
income deprivation might induce a perception of fairness in the usage of pirated software (see 
Glass and Wood 1996). ‘Equity constructs’ employed by Douglas et al. (2007) in the same 
stream of literature can be traceable to the notions of income-inequality and pro-poor growth, 
which lead us to briefly discuss another dimension of how our findings on GDP per capita are 
consistent with a stream of literature on the nexus between income-inequality and software 
piracy. 
 The intuition for engaging with the connection between GDP per capita and income-
equality builds on the fact that the GDP per capita variable is computed as an average and hence, 
it inherently assumes equity in the distribution of fruits from economic prosperity. Accordingly, 
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inequality increases software piracy (Andrés 2006b) and software piracy also decreases income-
inequality (Asongu 2014b). It follows that the issue of fairness extends beyond perceptions 
regarding macroeconomic evidence in poor countries. As a policy implication, equitably 
distributed wealth reduces software piracy, and the tendency not to indulge in software piracy 
because of equitably distributed wealth increases with increasing software piracy levels. In other 
words, the negative degree of responsiveness of software piracy to changes in income levels is 
an increasing function of software piracy13.  
Regarding the second of the four categories mentioned above, the documented positive 
relationship between per capita income and human development could take several forms, inter 
alia: R&D, financial development and better governance. For brevity, clarity and consistency, it 
can be stated that the narrative of this category accords with the discourse of the preceding 
category which deals with ‘income, equity, equality and software piracy’. This analogy is 
possible if we establish that compared to low-income nations, high-income countries are more 
positively correlated with dimensions of development, namely: R&D expenditure, financial 
depth and the rule of law. First, it is logical that high-income countries are more likely to allocate 
more financial resources for research and development purposes. Second, high-income nations 
are also associated with higher levels of financial development in terms of financial depth or 
money supply for at least  two reasons: (1) compared to low-income countries, a great portion of 
the monetary base of high income countries circulates within the formal banking sector (Abu-
Bader and Abu-Qarn, 2008; Gries et al. 2009, p. 1851), (2) even the share of monetary base that 
is withheld within the formal banking sector of low income countries is characterized by 
substantial issues of surplus liquid liabilities (or bank deposits) (Saxegaard 2006), hence limiting 
money supply. Third, high-income countries are associated with higher levels of rule of law 
compared to their low income counterparts (Rigobon and Rodrik 2004, p. 533).  
 After presenting the analogy of high-income and low-income countries, we then proceed 
to engaging with some more practical insights in the same chronological order of variables. First, 
we have established that R&D decreases software piracy with a negative threshold or increasing 
                         
13
 In other words, increasing income levels decrease the ability to pirate and the magnitude of the negative 
relationship increases with increasing piracy levels. For example, ceteris paribus a $500 average income (or GDP 
per capita) decreases software piracy more in countries where initial levels of software piracy are high compared to 
countries where initial levels of software piracy are low. Moreover, given that piracy levels are higher in low income 
countries, ceteris paribus, the effect of an annual average income of $500 would have a higher decreasing effect in 
low income countries than the same effect in high income countries. 
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negative magnitude. The finding complements Asongu (2014b) (who has concluded that 
software piracy boosts research for scientific publications) by providing evidence of a reversed 
effect throughout the conditional distribution of software piracy. Second, the deterring role of 
money supply with negative thresholds in top quintiles is consistent with our expectation since 
software piracy is the result of activities from people who lack money to buy the genuine 
software. This finding has confirmed our expectation by establishing that in countries with 
comparatively high software piracy rates (or in top quintiles), the negative responsiveness of 
software piracy to money supply increases with increasing levels of software piracy. Third, the 
point that the rule of law reduces piracy is consistent with: (i) Yoo et al. (2011) on certainty in 
punishment; (ii) Driouchi et al. (2015) in relation to good institutions and (iii) Andrés and 
Asongu (2013) with respect to good governance. We have complemented the existing literature 
by establishing that the negative effect of governance on software piracy is very likely to be U-
shaped, with the trough or highest negative effect in the median (or 0.50th) quintile.  
 In the third category on IPRs regimes and software piracy, we have established that with 
the exceptions of constitution and IP laws which respectively have insignificant and positive 
effects on software piracy for the most part, the other IPRs regimes significantly reduce software 
piracy. The positive effect of IP laws and negative impact from other IPRs channels is consistent 
with Asongu (2015).  Furthermore, subtle differences exist between the findings of this inquiry 
and those of Asongu (2015), notably: (i) WIPO treaties, main IP laws, and multilateral treaties 
are negative with increasing negative magnitude at the top end of the software piracy 
distributions; (ii) bilateral treaties are negative for the most part in the bottom half of the 
distributions and (iii) the positive effect from IP laws is consistent, regardless of initial levels of 
software piracy.  
 The insignificant effect of constitution implies that the mere appearance of the term 
‘copyright’ in a country’s constitution does not guarantee the respect of software copyright laws 
by its citizens. Accordingly, the enshrinement of copyright in the constitution needs to be 
complemented with the adoption and enforcement of IPRs laws. These processes may involve 
the ratification of bilateral, multilateral and WIPO treaties on IPRs protection.  As a policy 
implication: (i) constitutional support for copyright laws should be complemented with the 
adoption and enforcement of IPRs laws and treaties in order to achieve a negative effect on 
software piracy and (ii) the negative effects of IP treaties and laws are more significant with 
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increasing negative magnitudes at the top end of the software piracy distribution or countries in 
which initial piracy levels are relatively high.  
 We explain some unexpected signs in the fourth category, namely from: population, 
internet penetration and life expectancy. First, the negative effect from life expectancy is 
probably because countries with high life expectancies are also associated with high income 
levels. Therefore, ‘software piracy’ externalities from life expectancy broadly align with 
narratives of the first-two categories in this ‘discussion of results’ section. Second, the negative 
effect of internet penetration may be traceable to its high correlation with population (see Beck et 
al. 2013, p. 665-672).  Third, the effect of population is not clear-cut when corresponding 
estimates from both tables are compared. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This study has examined tools of fighting software piracy throughout the conditional 
distributions of software piracy in 99 countries for the period 1994-2010, using contemporary 
and non-contemporary quantile regressions. The intuition for modelling, contingent on existing 
levels of software piracy is that the effectiveness of tools against piracy may consistently 
decrease or increase concurrently with increasing levels of software piracy. We have found that 
GDP per capita, research and development expenditure, main intellectual property laws, 
multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties, World Intellectual Property Organisation treaties, money 
supply and respect for the rule of law have negative effects on software piracy. Equitably 
distributed wealth reduces software piracy and the tendency not to indulge in software piracy 
because of equitably distributed wealth increases with increasing software piracy levels. Hence, 
the negative degree of responsiveness of software piracy to changes in income levels is an 
increasing function of software piracy. Moreover the relationships between policy instruments 
and software piracy display various patterns, namely: U-shape, Kuznets-shape, S-shape and 
negative thresholds. A negative threshold represents negative estimates with increasing negative 
magnitude throughout the conditional distributions of software piracy.  
 More specifically, the following findings have been established. First, there is evidence 
of a negative threshold from: (i) GDP per capita and internet penetration throughout the 
distribution of software piracy and (ii) research and development and main IP law from the 0.25th 
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to the 0.90th quintiles. Second, the simple fact of mentioning ‘copyright’ in a country’s 
constitution has no significant effect. Third, depending on model and contemporaneous character 
of specification, negative effects from multilateral treaties are U-shaped, S-shaped and Kuznets 
shape. Fourth, the negative impact of WIPO treaties is in top quintiles, with a negative threshold. 
Fifth, the negative effect of bilateral treaties is more apparent in the bottom quintile through the 
0.75th quintile. Sixth, whereas money supply decreases software piracy with a negative threshold 
effect in top quintiles, the impact of the rule of law is U-shaped throughout the software piracy 
distributions.  
 In the light of these findings, it is apparent that blanket policies against software piracy 
are unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on initial levels of software piracy and tailored 
differently across countries with low, medium and high levels of software piracy. Hence, 
modelling software piracy throughout its conditional distribution allows space for more policy 
implications, which have been discussed in the preceding section. Unfortunately among the six 
IPRs law channels used in the study, the effect of constitution and IP law have been insignificant 
and positive respectively. Interacting these indicators with the other four (main IP law, WIPO 
treaties, bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties) is an interesting future line of inquiry 
because it might elucidate if the simultaneous adoption of IPRs regimes can improve extant 
knowledge on the policy relevance of mechanisms which display insignificant and unexpected 
signs.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Abbreviation Definition of variables  Sources 
    
Piracy Piracy Logarithm of Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Growth per capita GDP Logarithm of GDP per Capita, PPP (international constant 
dollars, 2005) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Research and 
Development  
R & D Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet Penetration Internet Logarithm of Internet Users per 1000   GMID 
    
PC Users  PC Logarithm of PC Users per capita  GMID 
    
Population  Pop. Logarithm of Population  World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Rule of Law 
 
R.L 
“Rule of Law (estimate): Captures perceptions of the extent 
to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Life Expectancy  Life E. Logarithm of Life Expectancy at birth (total years)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Financial Depth  Finance Monetary base plus savings, demand and time deposits (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Constitution  Const. Dummy variable: Copyright is mentioned in the 
constitution  
WIPO 
    
Main_IP_law MIPlaw Main Intellectual Property Law WIPO 
    
IP_rlaw IPlaw Intellectual Property Rights Law WIPO 
    
Wipotreaties WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization  WIPO 
    
Mutilateral Multi. Multilateral Treaties  WIPO 
    
Bilateral Bilat.  Bilateral  Treaties  WIPO 
    
WDI: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. BSA: Business Software Alliance. GMID: 
Global Market Information Database. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Log: Logarithm. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization.  
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics (1994-2010) 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Obs 
  
     
Dependent 
Variable  
Software Piracy rate  0.255 0.449 -0.602 1.995 1500 
       
 
First Set of 
Control Variables  
(Institutional, 
macroeconomic 
and ICT related) 
GDP per capita (log) 4.006 0.433 3.008 4.924 1643 
Research & Development (R & D) 1.079 0.963 0.006 4.864 811 
Internet Penetration (log) 2.807 1.183 -1.000 5.622 1616 
Personal Computer Users (log) 3.009 0.837 0.698 5.464 1557 
Population (log) 7.063 0.712 5.424 9.126 1682 
Rule of Law  0.337 0.956 -1.657 1.964 1082 
Life Expectancy (log) 1.855 0.049 1.622 1.918 1578 
Finance   0.622 0.497 0.061 4.781 1401   
       
 
Second Set of 
Control Variables 
(IPRs laws and 
treaties  related) 
Constitution 0.242 0.428 0.000 1 1683 
Main IP Law 2.134 2.550 0.000 20 1683 
IP Law 2.260 4.669 0.000 47 1683 
WIPO Treaties  3.455 1.877 0.000 7 1683 
Multilateral Treaties  10.594 5.816 0.000 25 1683 
Bilateral Treaties  0.998 2.532 0.000 21 1683 
       
 
      
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
“Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,  Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Guatemala,  Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, UAE, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia”.  
 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. ICT: Information and Communication Technology.  Scandi: Scandinavian. Obs: 
Observations.  
Source of Panel A: Authors’ calculation.
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Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis     (Uniform sample, n=486) 
                
Piracy 
rate 
Macroeconomic, institutional and ICT-related  control variables IPRs laws and treaties  related control variables  
GDP R & D Internet PC Pop. R.L Life E. Finance Const. MIPlaw IPrlaw WIPO Multi. Bilat.  
1.000 -0.766 -0.703 -0.503 -0.551 0.009 -0.770 -0.535 -0.421 0.108 -0.405 -0.109 -0.215 -0.534 -0.180 Piracy  
 1.000 0.653 0.386 0.482 -0.206 0.806 0.736 0.476 -0.173 0.285 0.067 0.077 0.376 0.160 GDP 
  1.000 0.424 0.530 0.044 0.711 0.487 0.367 -0.161 0.221 -0.042 0.035 0.414 0.248 R & D 
   1.000 0.897 0.609 0.262 0.306 0.227 0.145 0.284 0.196 0.119 0.316 0.299 Internet 
    1.000 0.688 0.379 0.356 0.258 0.123 0.286 0.197 0.036 0.319 0.340 PCs 
     1.000 -0.207 -0.175 -0.055 0.269 0.068 0.179 -0.087 0.031 0.231 Pop. 
      1.000 0.591 0.497 -0.150 0.294 0.058 -0.024 0.438 0.115 R.L 
       1.000 0.424 -0.093 0.174 0.132 0.263 0.397 0.137 Life E. 
        1.000 -0.123 0.204 0.017 -0.175 0.062 0.008 Finance 
         1.000 0.075 0.348 0.068 -0.098 0.241 Const. 
          1.000 0.513 0.168 0.184 -0.087 MIPlaw 
           1.000 0.209 0.147 -0.006 IPlaw 
            1.000 0.569 0.176 WIPO 
             1.000 0.078 Multi. 
              1.000 Bilat. 
                
GDP: GDP per capita. R&D: Research and Development. Internet: Internet penetration. PC: Personal Computer Users. Pop: Population. R.L: Rule of Law. Life E: Life Expectancy. 
Const: Constitution. MIPlaw: Main Intellectual Property Law. IPrlaw: Intellectual Property Rights Law. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization Treaties. Multi: Multilateral 
Treaties. Bilat: Bilateral Treaties.  
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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